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Abstract 
Purpose – This paper investigates the determinants of capital structure using a 
cross-section sample of 1481 non-financial firms listed on the Chinese stock 
exchanges in 2011. 
Design/methodology/approach – Employing four leverage measures (total leverage 
and long-term leverage in terms of both book value and market value, respectively), 
this study examines the effects of factors with proven influences on capital structure 
in literature, along with industry effect and ownership effect. 
Findings – We find that large firms favour debt financing while profitable firms rely 
more on internal capital accumulation. Intangibility and business risk increase the 
level of debt financing but tax has little impact on capital structure. We also observe 
strong industrial effect and ownership effect. Real estate firms borrow considerably 
more and firms from utility and manufacturing industries use more long-term debt 
despite compared with commercial firms. On the other hand, firms with state 
ownership tend to borrow more, while firms with foreign ownership choose more 
equity financing. 
Research limitations – The study uses cross-section data to avoid any potential time 
effects, which allows us to focus on our main research question – to identify the 
determinants of capital structure for Chinese firms. Future research may gain more 
insights using panel data and considering other factors such as crisis and financial 
reforms. 
Practical implications – These results may provide important implications to 
investors in making investment decision and to firms in making financing decisions. 
Originality/value – this paper uses by far the largest and latest cross-section sample 
from the Chinese stock markets, offering a more complete picture of the financing 
behaviours in the Chinese firms, with known characters and the impact of ownerships. 
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Paper type: Research paper  
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I. Introduction 
Since Modigliani and Miller (1958) first proposed the classic MM-Irrelevant theory 
asserting that firm value is independent of its capital structure in a perfect financial 
market, capital structure has become an important research subject. Over the past half 
century, different theories have been developed explaining the firms’ financing 
decision, including the trade-off theory (Miller, 1977), the pecking order hypothesis 
(Myers and Majluf’s, 1984), the agency cost theory (Jensen and Meckling, 1976), and 
the equity market timing theory (Baker and Wurgler, 2002). Meanwhile, studies 
suggest that capital structure is also affected by a set of firm level characteristics, such 
as profitability, size of firm, collateral value of assets, non-debt tax shields, growth 
opportunity, uniqueness, industry, and volatility (Titman and Wessels, 1988); the 
macroeconomic environment (Korajczyk and Levy, 2003); and ownership structure 
(Bajaj et al., 1998).  
Both theoretical and empirical research has focused on developed countries with 
limited attention to developing countries. Although the decisive factors of capital 
structure in developed countries are relevant in developing countries (Booth et al., 
2001), the distinct institutional features may lead to significant differences (Wald, 
1999; Chen, 2004). For example, non-financial firms in US rely on internal capital 
financing by more than 62% (Myers and Majluf, 1984), in contrast to firms in China 
that raise more than 50% of capitals from equity issuance or external debt (Chen, 
2004). Indeed, there is a gap in literature on whether the classic theories derived from 
developed countries also work in developing countries. This paper attempts to fill in 
the gap and enrich our understanding by investigating the determinants of capital 
structure of non-financial firms from the perspective of developing countries, in 
particular, China.  
We consider China as a natural laboratory that provides us a unique institutional 
and economic environment for investigating the determinants of capital structure. 
First, China is the second largest economies in the world and the largest emerging 
economy with increasingly influential role in the world’s economic system.  
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However, this economic miracle has been achieved without a modern financial 
system in place. For instance, the bond market in China is still in its infancy and the 
majority of bond issuance is treasury bonds with only 3% of corporate bonds issuance 
(Zhang, 2008). Second, Chinese economy is in a transitional process from a 
centrally-planned economic system to a market-oriented one and its security markets 
emerged only in the 1990s. The development of the capital markets and the growth of 
non-state financial institutions have been hindered by the monopoly of state (Chen, 
2004) and both the financial markets and economic institutions are in an urgent need 
for further development. Third, a large number of large listed firms are state-owned 
enterprises (SOEs) that enjoy the monopoly power while not necessarily pursue 
profits. SOEs are subject to a soft credit constraint without effective financial 
supervision mechanisms and bankruptcy constraints as in developed countries. Finally, 
listed firms in China use significantly more short-term debt than long-term debt. Some 
firms even have no long-term debt. Short-term debt may lower financing costs in the 
short run, but may increase the financial and operational risks, which in turn 
undermines the sustainability of firms’ development in the long run.  
This paper investigates the determinants of the capital structure using a 
cross-section sample of 1481 non-financial firms listed on the Chinese stock 
exchanges in 2011. Employing four leverage measures (total leverage and long-term 
leverage in terms of both book value and market value, respectively), this study 
examines the effects of factors with proven influences on capital structure in literature, 
along with industry effect and ownership effect. We find that large firms favour debt 
financing while profitable firms rely more on internal capital accumulation. 
Intangibility and business risk increase the level of debt financing but tax has little 
impact on capital structure. We also observe a strong industry effect that real estate 
firms borrow considerably more and firms from utility and manufacturing industries 
use more long-term debt compared with commercials firms. Furthermore, ownership 
structure is found to have a significant impact on financing decision. Firms with state 
ownership tend to borrow more, in contrast to firms with foreign ownership that 
choose more equity financing. These results may provide important implications to 
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investors in making investment decision and to firms in making financing decisions. 
The rest of this paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 reviews literature. Section 3 
describes data and empirical models. Section 4 analyzes results and section 5 
concludes.  
 
2. Literature Review 
The earliest capital structure theory can be traced back to 1952 when Durand argued 
that capital structure is a relevant factor for firm valuation. Modigliani and Miller 
(1958, 1963) assert that the capital structure is irrelevant in determining the market 
value of a firm in a perfect market without taxes and transaction and bankruptcy costs 
and higher leverage increases the required return on equity because of higher risks. 
But with taxes, leverage can lower a firm’s tax payment because interest payments are 
deductable before tax and thus optimal capital structure exist as the leverage level 
increases the weighted average cost of capital (WACC) decreases.     
The trade-off theory argues that a firm is faced with increased financial risk when 
obtaining tax saving from debt financing (Kraus and Litzenberger; 1973) and the 
optimal capital structure can be achieved when the marginal present value of the tax 
shield is equal to the marginal present value of the costs of financial distress arising 
from additional debt (Warner, 1977). This view is supported by empirical studies, 
such as Fama (1970), Warner (1977), Miller (1977), Diamond (1989), and Stulz 
(1990), Fama and French (2002), Morellec, Nikolov and Schurhoff (2012), among 
others. The implication is that profitable and growing firms with lower costs of 
financial distress should use more debt and equity financing may be a better choice 
for unprofitable and risky companies. However, this theory cannot explain why most 
profitable firms borrow the least and nor to answer why firms with same taxation have 
different capital structure (Chen and Strange, 2005).  On the other hand, a study by 
An (2012) finds the Chinese firms respond to a change of taxation regime by raising 
their capital structures.  
The pecking order theory (Myers and Majluf, 1984) proposes that firms usually 
prefer internal finance to external finance and prefer debt to equity when internal 
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finance is insufficient. This is to avoid adverse effect of asymmetric information that 
investors tend to believe that firms issue equity when stock prices are overpriced and 
therefore stock prices would fall after stock issue is announced. Shyam-Sunder and 
Myers (1999) support this view, while Frank and Goyal (2003) indicate that the theory 
better describes the behavior of large firms but not small firms. However, other 
studies suggest that firms with access to investment-grade debt may be reluctant to 
issue security (Chirinko and Singha, 2000; Chikolwa, 2009) and profitable firms 
actually have a lower debt ratio (Brennan ad Kraus, 1987; Narayanan, 1988; Noe, 
1988; Heinkel and Zechner, 1990; Rajan and Zingales, 1995; Fama and French, 
2002). 
The agency cost theory (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Jensen, 1986) claims that 
the optimal utilisation of debt could increase the value of shareholders but 
overwhelming debt financing may cause damage. Firms incur agency costs (i.e. 
monitoring and bonding costs) to ensure agents (managers) acting in the best interests 
of principals (shareholders). When there is a separation between ownership and 
management, the conflict of goals between managers and owners and between 
different stakeholders emerges. For instance, equity holders with residual claims and 
limited liability concern more about profits from venture investment, while the 
debt-holders concern more the security of their claims. Harris and Raviv (1991) test 
for the agency costs hypothesis and show a bidirectional impact of capital structure 
and agency problems. Berger and Bonaccorsi di Patti (2005) suggest that managers of 
highly leveraged firms may shift risk or reduce effort to control risk, resulting in 
expected costs of financial stress, bankruptcy, or liquidation. Morellec, Nikolov and 
Schurhoff (2012) examine the conflicts between shareholders and agents in capital 
structure decisions and confirm the conflicts in choosing an optional capital structure 
and how governance mechanism mitigating the issue. 
Taking the market fluctuation into consideration, the equity market timing 
hypothesis is proposed by Myers and Majluf (1984) and subsequent studies document 
that firms tend to raise equity funds when the market values are high and repurchase 
equity when the market values are low (Taggart, 1977; Baker and Wurgler, 2002; 
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Chen, 2004; Alti, 2006). Baker and Wurgler (2002) claim that the persistent effect of 
the fluctuations in market valuation on capital structure last for more than a decade, 
while a more recent study by Kayhan and Titman (2007) shows that the effect of 
market timing on financing activity is only in the short run. The equity market timing 
theory successfully predicts the effect of market-to-book ratio, but equity market 
timing should not be the only factor on the prediction of data patterns (Frank and 
Goyal, 2009).  
Inspired by the variety of theories, a voluminous research investigates the 
determinants of capital structure. Titman and Wessels (1988) examine a set of control 
variables determining capital structure and find that the leverage is positively related 
to firm size, fixed assets, non-debt tax shields, investment opportunities, but 
negatively associated with volatility, advertising expenditure, the probability of 
bankruptcy, profitability, and the uniqueness of the products. These findings are 
supported by subsequent studies (Harris and Raviv, 1991; Rajan and Zingales, 1995; 
Frank and Goyal, 2003; Morellec et al., 2012), except for Wald (1999) that reports a 
negative relationship between leverage and non-debt tax shields. Ownership structure 
is also found to affect capital structure and a positive correlation between ownership 
and debt-equity ratio is documented by Leland and Pyle (1977) and Bajaj et al. 
(1998). 
Given the under-developed capital markets, research on capital structure in 
developing countries is scarce. Existing studies (Booth et al, 2001; Wiwattanakantang, 
1999) indicate that literature on capital structure in developed countries is relevant to 
developing countries, while the differences in the institutional and economic 
environment also matter (Wald, 1999; Huang and Song, 2006; Chen, 2004). Based on 
data on 221 industrial listed firms on Shanghai Stock Exchanges (SHSE) during 
1995-1997, Hong and Shen (2000) find that profitability and size are significant 
factors in determining the debt ratio. A later study by Chen (2004) suggests that firms’ 
debt level is positively affected by growth opportunity and tangibility, but negatively 
affected by profitability and firms’ size. It proposes a new pecking order for Chinese 
firms: retained profit, equity, and long-term debt. Li, Yue and Zhao (2009), using a 
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dataset of private firms, report a positive relation between state owned shares and 
leverage, and negative one between foreign ownership and leverage. 
In an imperfect capital market with corporate tax, transaction and bankruptcy 
costs, and asymmetric information, different firms face different financing 
instruments related to diverse levels of financial distress costs as evidenced by the 
latest study by Oztekin and Flannery (2012). Given the uniqueness of Chinese 
institutional infrastructure and economic environment, it is important to examine the 
determinants of the capital structure of Chinese firms and contribute to literature from 
the perspective of developing countries. Findings from China will also be of particular 
relevance to other developing countries and emerging economies. 
 
3. Data, variables and empirical models 
3.1 The definition of variables  
The dependent variable – capital structure – can be defined differently. MM theory 
suggests defining the capital structure in terms of the market value of debt and equity. 
However, financial market fluctuations make market value measures difficult and 
unreliable (Myers, 1977) and managers are also reluctant to continuously rebalance 
the capital structure in response to equity market movements due to the costs of policy 
adjustment (Graham and Harvey, 2001). On the other hand, accounting book value 
measures are backward looking, which may prevent firms from making accurate 
financing decision (Welch, 2004). Some empirical studies employ market value 
measures (Baker and Wurgler, 2002; Barclay et al., 2006), while others use both 
market value and accounting book value measures (Bennett and Donnelly, 1993; 
Booth, 2001; Alti, 2006). Moreover, early studies tend to employ a single leverage 
ratio (either long-term or total leverage ratio) (Bennett and Donnelly, 1993; Bradley et 
al., 1984; DeWenter and Malatesta, 2001). Indeed, a firm’s financing capability is 
affected by the compositions of debts (Huang and Song, 2006) and more recently 
studies use multiple leverage ratio (i.e. total debt, short-term debt, and long-term debt) 
to depict a more complete picture of financing decision (Titman and Wessels, 1988; 
Rajan and Zingales 1995; Frank and Goyal, 2003). This paper employs four measures 
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of leverage: the ratio of total debt to total assets by book value (BTD), the ratio of 
total debt to total assets by market value (MTD), the ratio of long-term debt to total 
asset by book value (BLD), and the ratio of long-term debt to total asset by market 
value (MLD).    
Following literature, this paper considers a wide range of factors that may affect 
firms’ financing decision. Table 1 presents a summary of explanatory variables. The 
first factor is the Size of firm (Size). Literature generally suggests that the firm’s size 
has a positive impact on leverage. The trade off theory argues that larger firms have 
lower costs of financial distress and would borrow more. The pecking order theory 
indicates that large firms face less information asymmetries problems and could issue 
informational sensitive securities than small firm (Kester, 1986). Moreover, big firms 
tend to choose long-term debt whilst small firms choose short-term debt (Marsh, 
1982). This study uses the natural logarithm of gross sales as the proxy for the size of 
firm to address the possible nonlinearity of the relationship between firm size and 
leverage as Li et al. (2009) and Huang and Song (2006).  
 
[Table 1 around here] 
 
The second factor is the Growth opportunity (Grow). Trade off theory believes 
that firms with high growth opportunity could face higher costs of financial distress 
and thus prefer equity. Firms with high growth opportunity may also have more real 
options for future investment (Myers, 1977). In contrary, the pecking order theory 
believes that higher growth opportunities lead higher capital demand for debt. The 
growth of a firm can be defined as the main operating income growth (MOIG) to 
indicate the realized growth result (Wald, 1999; Morellec, et al., 2012) and the total 
asset growth to indicate a firm’s growth potential (Titman and Wessels, 1988). This 
study follows the former and defines growth opportunity as the MOIG within the 
latest three years as in Eq. (1). As the trade-off theory explaining growth opportunity 
may be inapplicable to Chinese firms given their low level of technology (Chen, 
2004), this study follows the pecking order theory and expects a positive coefficient.  
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where OI is operating income. 
The third factor is Profitability (PROF). The tax-based theory predicts that 
profitable firms with more interest tax shields may borrow more. Under the agency 
cost theory, Williamson (1988) argued that debt can be seen as a disciplining device 
for managers to ensure they maximize profit for shareholders rather than excessive 
pursuit of firm growth. For a profitable firm with adequate cash flow, a high leverage 
can restrain the management. The pecking order theory indicates that profitable firms 
with sufficient internal funds would borrow less. As the pecking order theory is more 
relevant in China (Chen, 2004; Chen and Strange, 2005), we expect a negative 
relationship between profitability and leverage. Profitability is measured by the ratio 
of gross profit to total asset (ROA).  
The forth factor is Intangibility (INTANG). Intangible assets (i.e. copyright, 
goodwill, knowledge activities and the like) play an important role in firms’ financing 
decision (Rajan and Zingales 1995) as these assets may act as collateral (Liu, 2001). 
The trade off theory and the agency theory suggest a negative association between 
intangible assets and gearing, while the pecking order theory implies that firms with 
more intangible assets confront more asymmetric information problem and thus use 
more debt financing. The intangibility is proxied by the ratio of intangibility assets to 
total assets and a positive sign is expected.  
The fifth factor is Tax shields effects (Tax). MM theory indicates that the tax 
shield effect of debt incentivise firms to raise leverage. Non-debt tax shield from the 
tax deduction for depreciation, intangible assets amortization, and long-term deferred 
expenditures, has similar tax benefit (DeAngelo and Masulis, 1980). Although 
majority of studies affirm a positive tax shield effect on firms’ financing decision, the 
effect may vary with different institutions and tax policies across different countries 
(Booth et al., 2001). For example, in China the central government possesses strong 
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controlling power on the property rights and administration of corporations, which 
may substantially influence tax planning and make the tax shield effect ambiguous 
(An, 2012). Following Chen and Strange (2005), tax shield effect is proxied by the 
ratio of corporate income tax to operating profit. 
The sixth factor is Business risk and Financial distress (Risk). The trade-off 
theory predicts a lower leverage ratio for firms with higher risk. Higher gearing 
increase the volatility of the profit, which leads to higher expected costs of bankruptcy. 
In contrary, the pecking order theory predicts a higher leverage ratio for firms with 
higher risk as these firms tend to borrow more due to adverse selection effect. 
Following literature (Bradley et al., 1984; Titman and Wessels, 1988; Booth et.al., 
2001), this study tests for whether the trade-off theory better explains the relationship 
between risk and debt ratio and we expect a negative coefficient. Risk is defined as 
the standard deviation of the return on equity using three-year data from 2009 to 2011. 
This study also considers the industrial effect on capital structure. Both 
theoretical and empirical literature suggests that leverage ratio differs significantly 
across different industries (Schwartz and Aronson, 1967; Hamada, 1972; Harris and 
Raviv, 1991; MacKay and Phillips, 2005; Chen, 2004; Jensen, 1986) with an 
exception of Hatfield et al. (1994) that find little industrial impact. This study divides 
firms into five industrial sectors, namely commercial, conglomerates, manufacturing 
industry, public utility, and real estate. Five dummy variables (D1-D5) are employed 
to capture the industrial effect on leverage. 
The last factor is Ownership structure (OS). Agency theory suggests that 
ownership structure is correlated with financing decision due to conflicts of interests 
between different stakeholders. In China, firms’ ownership structure is different from 
those in developed countries due to the uniqueness of the Chinese securities market 
with a two-tier system of tradable and non-tradable shares. The central government 
holds controlling stakes in a large number of listed firms either directly through the 
State-owned Asset Supervision and Administration Commissions (SASAC) or 
indirectly by the state-controlled institutions. The state controls the marketable 
corporate assets at about 60% by market shares and 44% by share values (Huang and 
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Song, 2006), and the rest is owned by other investors (i.e., individual investors, 
foreign investors, and funds). This complicated ownership structure may have 
significant implication to financing decision and we are unable to predict the sign of 
the coefficients. This study classifies ownership structure into three types – state 
ownership (SOS), foreign ownership (FOS), and domestic private ownership (DOS).  
 
3.2 Empirical model 
The empirical specification of the model is shown in Eq. (2), which is estimated by 
ordinary least square (OLS) and White robust correction estimator for controlling 
heteroscedasticity. 
 
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where Yi denotes leverage measures (BTD, BLD, MTD, and MLD); Xi  are a set of 
factors explaining leverage for the ith listed firm; Dj (D1-D5) is a set of industrial 
effect dummies; OSk (SOS, FOS, DOS) is a set of ownership effect indicators; β0 is the 
constant; ui is the disturbance term; and kji and  ,  are coefficients to be 
estimated.  
  
3.3 Data   
The sample consists of a cross-section of 1481 non-financial firms for the year 2011, 
734 listed in Shenzhen Stock Exchange (SZSE) and 747 listed in SHSE. The sample 
excludes firms with shares traded in foreign currencies, with missing ownership 
information, and under “special treatment”. Data are collected from the China stock 
market research database (CSMAR) and DataStream.  
Table 2 provides sample descriptive statistics. The total debt ratio and long-term 
debt ratio in terms of book value is 52.64% and 14.40%, respectively, suggesting that 
Chinese listed firms rely heavily on short-term debt financing. In terms of market 
value, the total debt ratio is 32.60% and the long-term debt ratio is 6.17%, affirming 
the dominance of short-term debt financing. In fact, 36% of listed firms in China have 
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no long-term debt. One reason is the under-development of the Chinese capital 
markets that offer limited long-term debt facilities. The other reason is that Chinese 
listed firms pursue the lowest cost and minimum binding force and prefer equity to 
debt financing that is subject to a “hard constraint”. Industrial effect indicators are 
shown in Table 3. Real estate industry has the highest average total debt ratio by both 
book value (62.72%) and market value (49.37%), while public utility industry 
(43.47%) and conglomerates (27.46%) has the lowest debt ratio by book value and 
market value, respectively.  
 
[Table 2 around here] 
 
[Table 3 around here] 
 
4. Empirical Analysis 
Tables 4 and 5 report the OLS results. The robust estimator provides identical 
coefficients but different t statistics and results are discussed wherever relevant but 
not reported to save space. Table 4 is the results from the baseline models consisting 
of conventional determinants of capital structure. The columns (1) and (2) show 
results for total debt ratio and long-term debt ratio by book value and the columns (3) 
and (4) are for total debt ratio and long-term debt ratio by market value. Results show 
that leverage measures by market value are better explained with higher R
2
 of 0.43 for 
MTD and 0.16 for MLD compared with those measures by book value with R
2
 of 0.15 
for BTD and 0.11 for BLD. Table 5 is the results from models with additional 
ownership effects. Columns (1) and (2) are results for book-valued total debt ratio and 
long-term debt ratio and columns (3) and (4) are total debt ratio and long-term debt 
ratio by market value. Similar to the baseline models, leverage ratios by market value 
are better explained, consistent with the original capital structure measure of MM 
theory. It also highlights the importance of equity market timing theory.  
 
[Table 4 around here] 
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4.1. Results from baseline models    
Our results show that firm size (SIZE) has a statistically significant positive impact on 
all leverage measures at the 99% significance level. Large firms are associated with 
high leverage due to their better debt financing capability, consistent with our 
expectation as well as the trade off theory and classic empirical studies by Rajan and 
Zingales (1995), Frank and Goyal (2003), and Marsh (1982). In addition to the 
theoretical argument that large firms suffer from less information asymmetries, our 
explanation is the speciality of Chinese financial markets. As argued in Chen and 
Strange (2005), large SOEs play a dominant role in the Chinese equity markets and 
they have been well supported by the state-controlled banking sector.  
As expected, firms’ profitability (PROF) is negatively associated with leverage 
ratio and the impact is more relevant to the total debt ratio by market value (MTD), 
providing evidence for the pecking order theory. This result is also consistent with 
existing studies in developing countries (i.e. Wiwattanakantang, 1999; Booth et al., 
2001; Chen, 2004). It appears that interest tax shield effect (the trade off theory) for 
profitable firms is limit in China perhaps because most of large listed firms are SOEs 
with multiple goals rather than profit maximization.  
As to the relationship between growth opportunity (GROW) and capital structure, 
results are mixed. Results from OLS regression suggest that the growth opportunity 
has no significant impact on capital structure regardless of leverage measures 
employed, while the robust estimator indicates a significant effect on book value 
leverage ratio. Firms with high growth opportunity have a high total leverage ratio but 
use less long-term debt. The positive effect on BTD is consistent with the trade off 
theory as well as studies by Baskin (1989) and Lu and Xin (1998). Indeed, growing 
firms may borrow more as their retained profits are insufficient to finance their 
development and investment. Growing firms with better future prospect may also be 
reluctance to issue shares to dilute the controlling power and earnings per share. On 
the other hand, the negative effect on BLD reflects the fact that Chinese firms prefer 
short-term debt.  
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The intangibility (INTANG) of assets has a significant and positive effect on 
BLD only, indicating that firms with a higher proportion of intangible assets tend to 
have a higher level of leverage in book value. The corporate income tax shield (TAX) 
effect appears an insignificant factor for Chinese listed firms making financing 
decisions, consistent existing literature (i.e. Bradley et al., 1984; Alfred, 1987). The 
present tax policy in China is to capitalise debt tax relating to investment assets that 
cannot be deducted directly and the non-debt tax shield is playing an increasingly 
important role to substitute for the tax benefits of debt financing. The immature bond 
markets also limit firms’ ability to benefit from tax shield effect.  
Business risk and financial distress (RISK) has a significant and positive impact 
on BTD. One possible reason is the speciality of the Chinese financial markets and 
economic system in which listed SOEs make up the biggest market share. In financial 
distress, these SOEs are able to borrow more due to the support from the government 
that has the ultimate power to determine a firm’s “survival” or “bankruptcy”. In fact, 
under the protection of the central government, listed SOEs earn monopolistic income 
without business risk – a legacy of historical centrally-planned economy. Furthermore, 
the imperfection of the Chinese financial markets stimulates speculative behaviour 
and it is hard to explain firms’ financing choices based on risk evaluation.  
This study classifies firms into five industries and estimation results show a 
statistically significant industrial effect on capital structure as expected, partially 
supporting the argument that the uniqueness of industry potentially affects the choice 
of corporate debt levels (Schwartz and Aronson, 1967; Harris and Raviv, 1991; Jensen 
1986; Titman and Wessel, 1988). The coefficients on conglomerates enterprises (D2) 
and manufacturing firms (D3) are insignificant for all different debt ratios, suggesting 
that the capital structure of these firms is not significantly different from the control 
group of commercial firms. An exception is that manufacturing firms have higher 
long-term debt ratio in term of market value. Public utility corporate (D4) tend to 
borrow more long-term debt (BLD and MLD) but their overall debt level is low 
(BTD), compared with commercial firms. Real estate firms (D5) have a significantly 
higher level of debt irrespective of leverage measures. This may be due to the distinct 
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characteristic of their asset structure that a higher proportion of tangible assets can be 
used as collateral to support debt financing.  
 
4.2. Results from ownership effect models 
This paper also investigates the ownership effect on capital structure, inspired by 
Shleifer and Vishny (1994) and DeWenter and Malatesta (2001). As reported in Table 
5, our results show a strong ownership effect on leverage, which are robust given no 
changes in signs or significance level of coefficients on other explanatory variables 
when including ownership structure variables.  
 
[Table 5 around here] 
 
We observe a positive association between state ownership and long-term debt 
ratio (BLD and MLD) that SOEs hold more long-term debt, consistent with DeWenter 
and Malatesta (2001) and Sapienza (2004). In China, the main reason is the unique 
“dual roles” of the government as the controlling shareholder/owner of both SOEs and 
large banks (Li et al., 2009). Despite of the privatization of SOEs, the government 
still plays a dominant role in the economy and SOEs are policy-driven rather than 
maximizing profit. The government prefers to shoulder the financial risk than to 
leverage or bail out failing SOEs. Meanwhile, the Chinese financial system is 
dominated by state-owned banks that grant credit to SOEs under government 
intervention. Moreover, it is difficult for state (as a major shareholder) to effectively 
monitor and control SOEs, which raise the equity agency cost and therefore enhances 
corporate access to more debt.  
We find a negative impact of foreign ownership on total debt ratio (BTD and 
MTD) and the impact is more significant when employing the robust estimator. This 
result is in contrast to the argument of Wiwattanakantang (1999) that foreign investors 
are faced with more severe asymmetric information problem and may increase the 
leverage to establish regulatory mechanism for taking managers under control. Our 
results nevertheless reflect the Chinese reality. According to the newly promulgated 
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Law of the People's Republic of China on Enterprise Income Tax in 2008, corporate 
tax rate is unified at 25% for both domestic company and foreign company. However, 
to attract foreign investment, foreign firms are given preferential taxation treatment of 
15% corporate tax rate, which encourage foreign investors to lower gearing, 
consistent with the trade off theory.  
The domestic private ownership is found to have a negative impact on total debt 
ratio by market value (MTD) with little influence on book value leverage. This 
suggests that the domestic private shareholders use less debt financing and equity 
financing is the dominant choice among private firms. This is not a surprising result. 
In China private firms have limited access to bank credits and the loan granting 
process is much harder and complicated for private firms. In fact, bank credits are 
mainly absorbed by large SOEs under government intervention (though less explicit 
nowadays). As Allen et al. (2005) point out that domestic private firms have to rely on 
alternative financing channels to obtain capital based on reputation and relationships.  
 
5. Conclusion and Future research 
This paper examines the determinants of capital structure using a sample of 1481 
non-financial listed firms in 2011, thereby enriching our understanding of financing 
behaviour in China. Employing OLS and robust estimators and measuring capital 
structure in terms of book value and market value, our results are generally consistent 
with literature in both developed and developing countries, while highlighting the 
speciality of Chinese financial markets.  
First, we find mixed evidence supporting different theories regardless of leverage 
measures employed. The capital structure is positively affected by firm size, providing 
evidence for the trade off theory, while it is negatively affected by profitability, 
suggesting that the pecking order theory is more relevant. Second, we find that firms 
with growth opportunity have a high total leverage ratio but use less long-term debt 
(book value) from robust estimator. Both intangibility and business risk are positively 
associated with book value leverage ratio only, while tax has little impact on capital 
structure. This mixed evidence, however, reflects Chinese specialities, such as 
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persistent government intervention in SOEs and large banks, the underdeveloped 
financial markets, low financing cost of equity, and the dominant role of state 
ownership in the economy and the financial sector. The tax shield effect of liability is 
too limited to incentivise firms to use debt, which is hampered by the immature bond 
markets with limted long-term debt facilities. In this regard, the pecking order theory 
and trade off theory have limited explanatory power in China. The capital structure of 
Chinese firms is less rational that firms use significantly more short-term debt, which 
is in sharp contrast to the debt policy in developed countries where the long-term is 
more representative. Third, we also observe a strong industrial effect on capital 
structure. Real estate firms use considerably more debt relative to the control group of 
commercial firms. Conglomerate firms and manufacturing firms have a similar debt 
level as commercial firms, except for manufacturing firms with higher long-term debt 
by market-value. Public utility sector tends to have more long-term debt but the 
overall debt level is lower than that of commercial firms. Finally, ownership structure 
is found to have a significant impact on capital structure. In particular, state-owned 
firms employ more long-term debt, domestic private firms use more equity capital (by 
market value), and foreign-owned firms have a significantly lower level of debt. 
Relative to developed nations, little is known about the capital structure of firms 
in developing countries, and in particular China. The capital markets are rapidly 
developing in China and future research could be in the following directions. First, 
this study focuses on capital choice of Chinese public listed firms and most of these 
firms are SOEs. However, 80% of non-listed firms are private firms and it is 
important to understand the capital decision of privately-owned non-listed firms given 
their increasingly important role in the economy. Secondly, Zingales (2000) highlights 
the enhanced importance of human capital in modern corporations, providing a new 
perspective when studying capital structure in the future. Thirdly, future study should 
look into other factors in a panel data context. For example, the debt-equity ratio is 
found to be correlated with aggregate investment and financial crises have a greater 
impact on the financing of corporate sectors in emerging markets (Davis and Stone, 
2004), and the equilibrium in the corporate debt market is affected by macroeconomic 
18 
 
shocks (de Bandt, Bruneau, and Amri, 2008). Finally, ongoing financial reforms will 
have significant impacts on firm financing decision. Allen and Carletti (2013) suggest 
new theories to underpin financial reforms, and the impact on capital structure of the 
development of new theories should be followed up.    
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Table 1: Explanatory variables: expectation, hypotheses, and definition. 
 
 
Explanatory 
variable 
Theoretical 
expectation 
Hypothesis  Definition 
SIZE + (trade off) 
-(pecking order) 
+ Logarithm of gross sales 
GROW -(trade off) 
+(pecking order) 
+ operating income growth rate 
during 2009-2011 
PROF +(trade off) 
-(pecking order) 
- Return on assets=gross profit / 
total assets 
INTANG -(trade off) 
-(agency cost) 
+(pecking order) 
+ Intangible assets / total assets 
TAX -(trade off) ambiguous Corporate tax / operating profit 
RISK -(trade off) 
+(pecking order) 
- Standard deviation of ROE 
OS 
 
 - ambiguous State-owned shares 
Foreign shares 
Domestic shares 
Industry 
(Dummy 
variables) 
  D1-D5 
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Table 2: Descriptive sample statistics 
Variables Mean S.D. Minimum Maximum 
BTD (%) 52.64 37.34 0.71 668.45 
BLD (%) 14.40 18.37 0.00 92.72 
MTD (%) 32.60 20.80 0.21 91.43 
MLD (%) 6.17 9.67 0.00 66.85 
Size 2128.12 155.54 904.41 2690.29 
Profitability (%) 4.98 11.89 -149.52 280.99 
Growth (%) 344.07 10157.70 -90.00 390000.00 
Intangibility (%) 4.97 6.67 0.00 67.64 
Tax (%) 16.70 120.12 -2285.86 3727.24 
Risk (%) 31.03 317.45 0.06 9697.85 
SOS (%) 6.41 16.08 0.00 84.71 
FOS (%)  0.69 5.56 0.00 77.59 
DOS (%) 5.40 14.14 0.00 91.72 
Notes: BTD: the book value of total debt ratio; MTD: the market value of total debt 
ratio; MLD: the market value of long-term debt ratio; BLD: the book value of the 
long-term debt ratio. 
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Table 3: Industrial average of Leverage (%) 
 Number 
of firms 
BTD BLD MTD MLD 
Commercial (D1) 123 54.19 10.82 34.72 3.88 
Conglomerates (D2) 237 53.47 11.48 27.46 4.11 
Manufacturing industries (D3) 897 52.09 12.77 31.74 5.56 
Public utility (D4) 112 43.47 28.57 31.28 11.55 
Real estate (D5) 112 62.72 23.38 49.37 12.55 
Note: BTD = the book value of total debt ratio; BLD = the book value of the 
long-term debt ratio; MTD = the market value of total debt ratio; MLD = the market 
value of long-term debt ratio.  
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Table 4: The regression results: Baseline – Conventional variables (No.obs: 1481) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
LEVERAGE  BTD BLD MTD MLD 
SIZE (ln Sales) 0.16 *** 0.022*** 0.08*** 0.18*** 
PROP -1.17*** -0.13*** -0.55*** -0.12*** 
GROW 0.55
-4 
 -4.18 0.69
-5
 -5.35 
INTANG 0.19 0.20*** -0.02 0.05 
RISK 0.008*** -0.002 0.002 -3.41 
TAX 0.001 0.16
-4 
 -0.002 0.27
-3
  
D2 -0.008 0.018 -0.024 0.01 
D3 -0.042 0.02 -0.014 0.02** 
D4 -0.109** 0.17*** -0.003 0.08*** 
D5 0.086 * 0.15*** 0.21*** 0.10*** 
Constant 0.26 ** -0.36*** -1.32*** -0.34*** 
R
2
 0.15 0.11 0.43 0.16 
F-statistic 26.86 18.63 109.51 27.06 
Observation 1481 1481 1481 1481 
Notes: (1) *, **, and *** signify the significance level at 90%, 95%, and 99%, respectively; 
(2) D1 is omitted to avoid multicollinearity; (3) We have tested for the correlations between 
independent variables and results show very low correlation among explanatory variables, 
indicating that the multicollinearity problem shouldn’t be a major concern. 
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Table 5: The regression results with ownership variables 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
LEVERAGE  BTD BLD MTD MLD 
SIZE (ln Sales) 0.15 ** 0.02*** 0.08*** 0.17*** 
PROP -1.16*** -0.13*** -0.54*** -0.12*** 
GROW 0.60
-4
 -4.20 0.14
-4
 -5.24 
INTANG 0.19 0.20*** -0.02 0.05 
RISK 0.008*** -0.002 0.002 -4.41 
TAX 0.001 0.63
-4
 -0.002 0.27
-4
 
D2 -0.008 0.02 -0.024 0.01 
D3 -0.04 0.02 -0.013 0.02** 
D4 -0.01** 0.17*** -0.004 0.08*** 
D5 0.09 * 0.15*** 0.21*** 0.10*** 
SOS 0.06 0.05* -0.004 0.03** 
FOS -0.26* -0.12 -0.17** -0.05 
DOS -0.03 0.03 -0.06** -0.003 
Constant 0.29 ** -0.35*** -1.31*** -0.33*** 
R
2
 0.16 0.12 0.43 0.16 
F-statistic 20.99 14.79 85.39 21.28 
Observation 1481 1481 1481 1481 
Notes: (1) *, **, and *** signify the significance level at 90%, 95%, and 99%, respectively; 
(2) D1 is omitted to avoid multicollinearity; (3) We have tested for the correlations between 
independent variables and results show very low correlation among explanatory variables, 
indicating that the multicollinearity problem shouldn’t be a major concern. 
 
